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Diffusions as a way round a refused Red Notice: what has really changed

On 10 March 2022 INTERPOL publicly barred a major member country — Russia — from sending diffusions directly for the first time. In doing so it indirectly admitted that diffusions could be used to bypass the stricter Red Notice route. What has changed since, and what has not.

Published . Reading time 12 minutes.

First: a refused Red Notice is not the end of the case

Many people who learn that a Red Notice was refused consider the matter closed. That is a dangerous mistake: a diffusion is a separate channel the requesting country can use for the same purpose. Before treating the risk as gone, check both data objects separately — with a request to the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files (CCF) — rather than relying on a refusal of one of them.

A refused Red Notice does not mean there is no diffusion in the same case: they are different objects and are checked separately.

Why the gap exists: one standard, two procedures

Constitution, Arts. 2(1), 3the same substantive requirements

In substance, INTERPOL’s Rules on the Processing of Data (RPD) require the same of a Red Notice and of a wanted-person diffusion: compliance with Articles 2(1) and 3 of the Constitution and the general conditions for recording data. On paper the standard is identical.

Red Notice and wanted-person diffusion: two routes Red Notice: NCB request, legal review by the NDTF under RPD Article 86, visible in the database only after approval. Wanted-person diffusion: the NCB is itself responsible for compliance under Article 99(2); the message goes by email at once to recipient bureaus marked as not yet approved; the database record becomes visible only after NDTF approval. For NCBs under corrective measures, such as Moscow from 10 March 2022, a diffusion first goes to the General Secretariat. Red Notice NCB requestrequesting country NDTF reviewbefore publication, Art. 86 Visible in the databaseonly after approval Wanted-person diffusion (WPD) NCB sends itself-responsible, 99(2) Email to recipient NCBsat once, “not yet approved” NDTF reviewfor the database record Visible in the databaseonly after approval
Based on RPD Arts. 86, 97–99 and INTERPOL’s “Compliance and review” page. For bureaus under corrective measures (NCB Moscow from 10.03.2022) a diffusion first goes to the General Secretariat and is forwarded only if found compliant.

RPD, Arts. 86 and 99(2)prior review vs NCB self-check

The difference is procedural. A Red Notice undergoes legal review by the General Secretariat before publication; today that is done by the Notices and Diffusions Task Force (NDTF). A diffusion is sent by the NCB itself, which must ensure the quality and lawfulness of the data and its compliance with Articles 2(1) and 3. Historically this was a self-certification model rather than central prior control, which is why critics called diffusions a workaround after a refused Red Notice. Checking and challenging diffusions is a separate service: diffusion removal.

The reform few people know about: the NDTF reviews diffusions too

Compliance and reviewinterpol.int

Even specialist sources relying on outdated descriptions often miss this. According to INTERPOL’s official “Compliance and review” page, incoming requests for Red Notices and WPDs (wanted-person diffusions) are not visible or searchable by member countries in INTERPOL’s information system until the NDTF has reviewed and approved them.2

The same page carries an important caveat: unlike Red Notices, WPDs reach recipient NCBs by email immediately, with a warning that they are subject to legal review and not yet approved by the General Secretariat. The old gap — “a diffusion goes out instantly with no review” — has narrowed but not closed: the database record waits for review, the message arrives at once.

Constitution, Arts. 2(1), 3a refusal closes the INTERPOL channel

If a request is refused for non-compliance with Article 2(1) or Article 3 of the Constitution, no further cooperation through INTERPOL’s channels is allowed on it. But the NDTF’s decision does not affect the validity of the criminal case in the requesting country or stop it seeking cooperation outside INTERPOL.

Syria and Russia: how INTERPOL responds to abuse

INTERPOL’s readiness to restrict a particular bureau did not start with Russia. The exact scope of such “corrective measures” is usually not disclosed, and lawyers and human-rights groups still criticise this opacity.

  1. 12.2012–10.2021Syria

    Corrective measures on NCB Damascus

    In place from December 2012, without affecting Syria's membership. The Executive Committee decided to lift them in June 2021 and the decision took effect in October 2021; the General Secretariat continues to monitor the bureau, and the measures can be reinstated. Their scope was never disclosed.6

  2. 10.03.2022Russia

    NCB Moscow diffusions only via the General Secretariat

    Weeks after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine: diffusions can no longer be sent from Moscow directly; each is first checked for compliance and forwarded only if found compliant.1

  3. 06.2022Russia

    Controls extended to all messages

    According to Disclose, three months later all communications of Russian police through INTERPOL channels came under enhanced control, not just diffusions.4

  4. 12.2022European Parliament

    Five states under measures

    INTERPOL Secretary General Jürgen Stock told the European Parliament that such measures applied to five states.5

  5. 04.2025leak

    Six countries under enhanced monitoring

    Harvard International Law Journal, citing leaked internal documents reported by Disclose: reportedly six countries, including Russia, Belarus and Syria.5 In January 2026 Disclose also wrote that corrective measures had been applied to Belarus and Syria.7

    Leaked data and journalistic reporting, not officially confirmed by INTERPOL: it has made no statement about measures against Belarus or about new measures against Syria after 2021.

  6. 07.2025ABA webinar

    30–40 % non-compliant requests — then zero

    An official of INTERPOL’s Office of Legal Affairs told an American Bar Association webinar about an NCB with a 30–40 % non-compliance rate over six months, many requests targeting activists and government critics; after measures were imposed the rate fell to zero within two years, he said.

    An oral statement; the country was not named.

What it means in practice today

  1. A higher bar, but not an absolute one

    Diffusions from bureaus under corrective measures — Russia and reportedly Belarus — face an extra layer of General Secretariat review. Such measures can work (the 30–40 % example), but no review is flawless: a diffusion that passes may still be wrong on substance.

  2. There is no list of countries under control

    INTERPOL does not publish it in full, and it changes. Known cases came to light through statements, leaks and parliamentary hearings. “My country was never in the news, so its diffusions go out unchecked” is not a safe assumption; in a specific case the position can be established, among other ways, through a request to the CCF.

  3. A refusal closes one channel

    Even after an NDTF refusal the country can pursue the person through bilateral extradition requests, regional mechanisms and diplomatic channels.

What the reform does not change

Routing all of one country’s diffusions through the General Secretariat is a targeted measure for individual NCBs. For everyone else, primary responsibility for compliance still lies with the sending NCB (RPD Art. 99(2)), and its diffusion reaches recipient bureaus by email before review is complete. The post-2022 changes narrowed the gap for a few countries and for the database itself, but did not rewrite the architecture of the diffusion system.

The 10 March 2022 statement is worth rereading in that light. INTERPOL did not say “we have closed the loophole”; in effect it said “we have tightened control over one country”, in response to a specific crisis and without changing the rules for the rest.

What no one can promise

What to do if a Red Notice has been refused

  1. Do not treat the refusal as final

    Assess with a lawyer whether a second attempt through a diffusion is likely.

  2. Ask the CCF about diffusions separately

    Through an access request. Bear in mind that a diffusion later refused by the NDTF may already have reached other bureaus by email and created a short-term risk of arrest.

  3. Prepare the grounds for a challenge

    They are the same as for a Red Notice: refugee status, the political character of the case, defects in the request. See also preventive protection and the reference entry on diffusions.

Questions

Is it true that a diffusion can always be sent without any review?

No. According to INTERPOL, wanted-person diffusions are not visible in its information system until the NDTF has reviewed and approved them. But recipient bureaus receive them by email immediately, marked as not yet approved, and the sending NCB remains responsible for compliance.

Do corrective measures mean diffusions from Russia or Belarus are no longer a risk?

No. For Belarus such measures have not been officially confirmed, and where they exist they reduce the risk but do not remove it: diffusions are only one channel, review can miss problems, and the state can seek extradition bilaterally or outside INTERPOL.

How can I find out whether a particular country is under measures right now?

INTERPOL publishes no complete, updated list. For a specific case this can be established, among other ways, through an official request to the CCF.

If a Red Notice was refused, is it worth checking for a diffusion separately?

Yes. They are different data objects in INTERPOL’s system, and a refusal of one does not mean the other does not exist.

Sources

Basis of this article: INTERPOL’s official statements and documents (RPD, “Compliance and review” page), the Disclose investigation and analysis in the Harvard International Law Journal.

  1. 1INTERPOL General Secretariat statement on measures concerning Russia, 10.03.2022interpol.int
  2. 2Compliance and review — NDTF review of Red Notices and WPDsinterpol.int
  3. 3INTERPOL Rules on the Processing of Data (RPD), Arts. 86, 97–99interpol.int
  4. 4Disclose — how Moscow tracks down its opponents through INTERPOLdisclose.ngo
  5. 5Harvard International Law Journal — “Corrective Measures and the Problem of Transparency at INTERPOL” (2026)journals.law.harvard.edu
  6. 6INTERPOL statement on lifting corrective measures applied to Syria, 15.10.2021interpol.int
  7. 7Disclose, 28.01.2026: Interpol turning blind eye to persecution by Tajik dictatorship (“Interpol Files” series)disclose.ngo

This article is general information, not legal advice. Information on measures concerning particular countries changes and is not published by INTERPOL in full.